

























The Dissertation Committee for Joonho Lee Certifies that this is the approved 
version of the following dissertation:  
 




    Committee:  
  
 Robert N. Freeman, Supervisor 
  
 Ross G. Jennings  
  
 Michael B. Clement 
  
 Paul C. Tetlock 
  
 Thomas W. Sager 
 








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin  
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
The University of Texas at Austin  






To My God, Dad, Mom, Sisters,  







I would like to express my most earnest gratitude to my committee members: 
Robert Freeman (chair), Michael Clement, Ross Jennings, Tom Sager, and Paul 
Tetlock.  I am deeply grateful to Robert for his insight and support.  He has been 
always generous with his time and advice throughout my doctoral studies.  I am 
grateful to Ross who posed many insightful questions and contributed valuable 
suggestions.  I am also greatly indebted to Michael for his tireless insight, patience, 
and suggestions that have improved this dissertation immensely.  I would like to 
thank my fellow Ph.D. students, especially Jenny Brown, Bill Mayew, Kirill 
Novoselov, and Neil Schreiber, for being such good friends and colleagues.  
Finally, my deepest thanks go to my parents, my sisters, and my wife, for their 
unconditional love and support.  They have been my source of strength.  Without 
them this would not have been possible.  
v 
 
Is Information Uncertainty Positively or Negatively Associated with 
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift? 
Publication No._____________  
 
Joonho Lee, Ph.D.  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2007  
Supervisor: Robert N. Freeman  
 
This dissertation reconciles ostensibly conflicting evidence from prior 
research about the association between information uncertainty and post-earnings-
announcement drift (PEAD).  According to traditional PEAD studies there should be 
a positive association between PEAD and uncertainty about the implication of an 
earnings announcement for future earnings, referred to in this dissertation as 
“information uncertainty.”  Empirical studies have documented both positive and 
negative associations, however.  In particular, studies that use analyst forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for information uncertainty report a negative association 
between information uncertainty and PEAD.  Although the authors of those studies 
argue that their results are consistent with behavioral finance theories, a negative 
association between information uncertainty and PEAD is troubling because it is not 
consistent with the notion that more reliable information improves market efficiency.  
In fact, previous empirical studies that use proxies for information uncertainty other 
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than analyst forecast dispersion find a positive association between information 
uncertainty and PEAD.   
This study argues that the negative association between analyst forecast 
dispersion and PEAD can be explained by “herding” behavior immediately after 
earnings announcements.  I introduce an analyst-based proxy for information 
uncertainty that mitigates the effects of herding on forecast dispersion.  I find that, 
after controlling for the effect of herding, there is a positive association between 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One of the best known market anomalies is post-earnings-announcement drift 
(PEAD), which means that prices continue to move up after positive earnings 
surprises and down after negative earnings surprises.  Since first documented by Ball 
and Brown (1968), many scholars have examined various explanations for PEAD.  
Although the debate is still ongoing, people seem to agree with several points.  First, 
PEAD is regarded as a market underreaction, although people disagree on the causes 
of the underreaction.  Second, the more information about firms the market has, the 
less likely PEAD is observed.  Many empirical studies support the second point.  For 
example, information increases and PEAD declines with firm size (Foster, Olsen, and 
Shevlin, 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Freeman and Tse, 1989).  If firms are 
followed by more analysts, who expedite information flow in the market, or firms are 
held by more sophisticated institutions, firms have less PEAD (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 
2000; Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky, 2000).  When firms provide additional 
information via conference calls, they are likely to have less PEAD (Kimbrough, 
2005).  All these examples show that even though the market is not perfectly efficient, 
it does utilize available information efficiently to some degree. 
This research suggests, by extension, that PEAD increases with the 
“information uncertainty” created by an earnings announcement, when 
announcement-related uncertainty is derived from analyst forecast distribution of 
future earnings.  However, a positive association between this form of “information 
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uncertainty” and PEAD has not been consistently supported by prior empirical 
research.   
Several recent studies that use analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for 
information uncertainty report a counter-intuitive result.  Specifically, Dische (2002) 
reports that higher abnormal returns can be achieved by applying an earnings 
momentum strategy to stocks with low forecast dispersion, i.e., forecast dispersion is 
negatively associated with PEAD.  Similarly, when measuring change of analyst 
uncertainty surrounding quarterly earnings announcement dates (based on Barron et 
al.’s (1998) analyst forecast decomposition model), Liang (2003) finds that when 
analyst uncertainty following quarterly earnings announcements is lower than 
uncertainty prior to the announcement, there is more PEAD, i.e., a negative 
association between information uncertainty and PEAD.  Both Dische (2002) and 
Liang (2003) ascribe their results to a behavioral finance theory which advances the 
notion that investors underweight new evidence and incompletely update their beliefs.  
Specifically, investors update their beliefs by too little with respect to more objective 
(i.e., less uncertain) information due to cognitive bias about the ‘strength’ and the 
‘weight’ of new evidence (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Griffin and Tversky, 
1992).1
In contrast to Dische (2002) and Liang (2003), Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) 
use firm age, return volatility, trading volume, and duration of firm’s future cash 
                                                 
1 Detailed explanations follow in chapter 2.  
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flows to proxy for information uncertainty and find evidence of a positive association 
between information uncertainty and PEAD.2  They argue that their results are 
consistent with a different behavioral finance theory which is based on investor 
overconfidence in their private information and self-attribution bias (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998).  In particular, Jiang et al. (2005) argue that 
investor overconfidence about their private information worsens when information 
uncertainty is high.3
This study attempts to reconcile these conflicting empirical results.  I argue 
that the negative association between information uncertainty and PEAD (as shown 
in Dische (2002) and Liang (2003)) is due to incorrect measurement of uncertainty 
about the implication of an earnings announcement for future earnings that is 
extracted from analysts’ forecasts. 
Extracting a measure of information uncertainty from analysts’ forecasts is an 
appealing idea because analysts play an important role in the market as information 
intermediaries (Schipper, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  However, analysts’ 
forecasts are influenced by their strategic decisions (Trueman, 1994; Hong, Kubik, 
and Solomon, 2000).  For example, Trueman (1994) posits that analysts’ forecasts do 
not necessarily reflect their best judgment due to “herding” behavior following the 
release of important price-relevant information, such as earnings.  This means that 
                                                 
2 Duration is a measure of implied equity duration introduced by Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004), 
and it measures how long it takes for the price of a stock to be repaid by its internal cash flows.  
3 Although Liang (2003) uses “analyst uncertainty” and Jiang et al. (2005) “information uncertainty” 
respectively, those two uncertainties do not seem distinguishable.  In this study, information 
uncertainty is used as the same meaning as analyst uncertainty or earnings uncertainty.  
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when low forecast dispersion is driven by analyst herding behavior, the observed 
relation between forecast dispersion and the level of information uncertainty may be 
misleading.  Furthermore, if analysts are more likely to herd when they are not sure 
about the information that they possess (i.e., when information uncertainty is high), 
low dispersion is in fact associated with high information uncertainty. 
Several recent studies investigate the influence of uncertainty about future 
earnings on analysts’ forecasts (Miller and Sedor, 2006;  Alti, Kaniel, and Yoeli, 
2006).  Miller and Sedor (2006) find that when uncertainty about future earnings is 
high, analyst forecast revisions are influenced by observed stock price changes.  Alti, 
Kaniel, and Yoeli (2006) analytically show that when investors face uncertainty about 
their private information, they wait for subsequent confirming news from the market.  
Following these studies, I hypothesize and find that for firms with large earnings 
surprises, analyst forecast dispersion is lower for firms with confirming abnormal 
returns than for firms without confirming abnormal returns.  
Clement and Tse (2003) also provide an insight about the influence of 
analysts’ motivation on analyst forecast dispersion.  They find that investors care not 
only about forecast accuracy but also about the timeliness of forecasts.  Therefore, I 
assume that when analysts are under time pressure, they are more likely to herd than 
to fully utilize their own judgment. 
Examining the pattern of analyst forecast updating behavior, I find that about 
half of forecast revisions are made by the end of the third day after an earnings 
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announcement, which suggests that analysts do care about forecast timeliness.  
Moreover, analyst forecast dispersion is much smaller for forecasts reported within 
five days following an earnings announcement (forecast window (0, 5)) than when 
forecasts are collected at later dates (forecast window (6, 45)), although each forecast 
group has similar numbers of forecasts.  I argue that this pattern of analyst forecast 
dispersion should be considered when forecast dispersion is used to measure 
information uncertainty.  I argue that a better measure of information uncertainty is 
obtained by using analyst forecasts updated late after an earnings announcement. 
 Like Liang (2003), I operationalize information uncertainty by Barron et al.’s 
(1998) measurement of analyst uncertainty, which is squared error in individual 
forecasts averaged across analysts, assuming that high uncertainty is associated with 
large forecast errors.  Barron et al. (1998) find that forecast dispersion is not a perfect 
measure of analyst uncertainty and analyst uncertainty can be measured more 
precisely by considering forecast errors and the number of forecasts.4  My final 
measure of information uncertainty is change in analyst uncertainty measured by 
subtracting post-announcement analyst uncertainty from pre-announcement analyst 
uncertainty.  I use change in uncertainty because the phenomenon I am trying to 
measure is the incremental effects of earnings announcements on the uncertainty of 
future earnings. 
                                                 
4 Detailed explanations follow in chapter 2. 
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Once I use late forecast updates (i.e., forecast window (6, 45)) and calculate 
the change in uncertainty, I find that change in uncertainty is positively (not 
negatively) associated with PEAD, i.e., when information uncertainty is higher, there 
is more post-earnings-announcement drift.  In contrast, when immediately updated 
forecasts are used (i.e., forecast window (0, 5)), change in uncertainty and PEAD are 
negatively associated, which is consistent with Liang (2003).  Therefore, I conclude 
that the negative association between information uncertainty and PEAD is caused by 
incorrect forecast collection timing.  Additionally, when using abnormal returns 
surrounding earnings announcements as an alternative earnings surprise measure 
(instead of forecast errors), I find a stronger positive association between information 
uncertainty and PEAD.  This result also supports my expectation that analyst forecast 
dispersion is sensitive to the market’s response to earnings surprises (i.e., analysts 
forecasts are influenced by confirming or non-confirming news from the market), and 
therefore using abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcements, which is used 
as an alternative earnings surprise measure in previous studies, can provide a more 
accurate relation between analyst forecast dispersion and PEAD.  
This study is important because it reconciles two conflicting empirical results 
and answers why there has been a disagreement.  The supporting evidence of the 
positive association between information uncertainty and PEAD is important because 
it strengthens the argument that reducing information uncertainty improves market 
efficiency, i.e., the benefits of more reliable or more objective information to the 
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market.  The validity of this intuitive notion would be questioned if the negative 
association between information uncertainty and PEAD were supported.  This study 
also contributes to the literature about analysts’ forecasts by showing that it could be 
problematic to naively use analyst forecast dispersion as an information uncertainty 
measure.  Analyst forecasts need to be carefully collected (i.e., collection timing 
matters) and decomposed (as in Barron et al. (1998)) to properly represent the level 
of information uncertainty.   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides 
a literature review about the association among information uncertainty, analyst 
forecast dispersion, and PEAD.  Chapter 3 presents the research questions and 
hypotheses.  Chapter 4 explains the research design and outlines the sample 
collection process.  Chapter 5 discusses the empirical results.  Chapter 6 then 




Chapter 2: Background and Prior Research 
2.1 Background  
One of the most puzzling market anomalies is PEAD, which reflects the fact 
that investors fail to incorporate predictable future earnings using publicly available 
current earnings information.  Despite numerous studies that have examined various 
explanations for PEAD, there is no dominant theory to explain what causes PEAD, 
and the debate is still ongoing.  More recently, behavioral finance researchers have 
discussed investors’ cognitive biases, which may lead to misinterpretation of earnings 
information, as possible causes of PEAD (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999).  In this 
chapter, I review several behavioral finance theories and perspectives of these 
theories about the relation between information uncertainty and PEAD.    
 
2.2 Prior Research 
2.2.1 Conservatism Bias and the Relation between Information Uncertainty and 
PEAD 
 Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) ascribe PEAD to conservatism bias.  
They claim that PEAD is explained by the theory that people rely too much on their 
priors, while paying too little attention to new information, i.e., people are slow to 
change their beliefs in the face of new evidence (Edwards, 1968).  For example, when 
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good earnings news occurs, investors underestimate the positive effect of the good 
news.   
Barberis et al.’s (1998) PEAD explanation is also partly based on Griffin and 
Tversky (1992), who claim that people update their beliefs based on the “strength” 
and the “weight” of new evidence.  Strength refers to such aspects of the evidence as 
salience and extremity, whereas weight refers to statistical informativeness, such as 
sample size.  According to Griffin and Tversky (1992), people focus too much on the 
strength of the evidence, while underestimating its weight, relative to a rational 
Bayesian, when revising their forecasts.5  Based on Griffin and Tversky (1992), 
Barberis et al. (1998) argue that investors seem to underweight information in 
quarterly earnings announcements, because a single earnings number can be regarded 
as weak information without any particular pattern or strength of its own.  In doing so, 
investors ignore the substantial weight that the latest earnings news has for 
forecasting the level of future earnings.  Therefore, investors underreact to quarterly 
earnings announcements.  
 The work of Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson (2000) is also related to the 
‘strength and weight’ story.  They show that prices tend to overreact to unreliable 
information and underreact to highly reliable information because investors’ 
confidence in information is moderated toward a central level.  They refer to this 
                                                 
5 The “weight” of the information could be interpreted as “credibility.”  
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phenomenon as “moderated confidence” because investor confidence is moderated 
toward an average level that is insufficiently high or low.  
A recent study by Liang (2003) examines the relation between PEAD and the 
cognitive bias about strength and weight.  She assumes that the level of the quarterly 
earnings surprise corresponds to the strength of the information, and that changes in 
forecast errors around earnings announcements correspond to the weight of the 
information.  Liang (2003) assumes that when analysts are uncertain about a firm’s 
future performance, they tend to have larger forecast errors.  She also argues that a 
large decrease in forecast errors after an earnings announcement implies a large 
decrease in analyst uncertainty, and the decrease in analyst uncertainty means that 
analysts receive very reliable new information.  
Liang (2003) finds that when holding the level of earnings surprise constant, 
firms with larger decreases in forecast errors have larger PEAD.  She argues that this 
result is caused by the fact that underreaction is amplified under the high weight (or 
very reliable information) situation.  In other words, investors underreact to quarterly 
earnings surprises that provide very reliable information about future earnings.  This 
underreaction is due to cognitive bias, which does not let investors fully appreciate 
the credibility (or the weight) of the earnings surprise.     
Similar to Liang (2003), Dische (2002) also shows that there is more PEAD 
when analyst forecast dispersion is low than when analyst forecast dispersion is high.  
He claims that this result supports the idea that investors focus too little on the weight 
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of new evidence, and update their beliefs in the right direction too conservatively.  
Furthermore, investors update their beliefs by too little with respect to more objective 
(reliable) information.  If analyst forecast dispersion is regarded as a proxy for 
information uncertainty (e.g., Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Barron and Stuerke, 1998; 
Clement, Frankel, and Miller, 2003), this result might indicate that information 
uncertainty and PEAD are negatively associated.  In sum, the results reported by 
Dische (2002) and Liang (2003) suggest a negative association between information 
uncertainty and PEAD.  
 
2.2.2 Overconfidence about Private Information, Self-Attribution Bias, and the 
Relation between Information Uncertainty and PEAD  
According to a different stream of behavioral finance theory, the association 
between PEAD and information uncertainty is claimed to be positive.  This theory 
posits that investors overestimate the precision of their own information signals 
(Odean, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001).  Specifically, 
Daniel et al. (1998) suggest that overconfidence about the precision of private 
information and self-attribution bias are driving forces of PEAD.  Daniel et al. (1998) 
claim that investors underestimate the information content of important public news 
such as quarterly earnings announcements, while too heavily relying on their private 
information.  Overconfidence about their private information is strengthened by a 
self-attribution bias.  For example, when initial investment positions are confirmed by 
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the market, investors draw on self-attribution bias to ascribe their success to their 
ability.  Conversely, when investment positions result in losses, investors blame bad 
luck or environmental factors which are beyond their control.   
Motivated by Daniel et al. (1998), Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) find that 
there is more PEAD when information uncertainty is high.  Jiang et al. (2005) 
propose three observations to support the positive relation between uncertainty and 
PEAD.  First, they state that under Daniel et al.’s overconfidence theory, there is a 
difference between the true distribution of firm value estimates and overconfident 
investors’ distribution of firm value estimates.  Specifically, overconfident investors 
have narrower distributions of firm values.  Moreover, Jiang et al. (2005) claim that 
high information uncertainty firms have more diffused (or flatter) distributions of 
value estimates than firms with low information uncertainty.  This means that 
differences between the true distributions of firm values and overconfident investors’ 
distributions are greater for high information uncertainty firms than for low 
information uncertainty firms.  Figure 1 illustrates the difference between an 
investor’s distribution and the true distribution for a low (Panel A) and a high (Panel 
B) information uncertainty firm.  In other words, Jiang et al. (2005) assume that 
investors cannot adjust the distribution of value estimates along with the change of 
uncertainty level.  Therefore, overconfidence bias is exacerbated for high uncertainty 
firms.   
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Second, Jiang et al. (2005) also claim that for high information uncertainty 
firms, the quality of investors’ private information is more difficult to assess.  In other 
words, there is less feedback from the market for high information uncertainty firms 
than for low information uncertainty firms.  Therefore, it takes more time for the 
market to learn the quality of investors’ private information and for price to reach the 
true value.  Third, Jiang et al. (2005) argue that high information uncertainty firms 
tend to be “story stocks,” in which otherwise reliable public signals look noisy, and 
private signals appear more plausible.  Therefore, investors are more likely to be 
influenced by rumors, and are more likely to speculate on the value of the stocks than 
to evaluate firms objectively.  In sum, all three characteristics that are related to high 
information uncertainty make it difficult for investors to assess the true value of the 
firm.  Therefore, it takes more time for stock prices to arrive at true values when 
information uncertainty is high, i.e., there is more PEAD.  Jiang et al. (2005) show 
this result when they use firm age, return volatility, trading volume, and the duration 
of the firm’s future cash flows as proxies for information uncertainty.  
In summary, empirical results based on two different behavioral finance 
theories collide with respect to the relation between PEAD and information 
uncertainty.  Both Dische (2002) and Liang (2003) argue that investors’ 
underreaction is exacerbated when information is more credible, i.e., when 
information uncertainty is low.  In other words, they find that low information 
uncertainty brings more PEAD than high information uncertainty.  In contrast, Jiang 
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et al. (2005) argue that high information uncertainty exacerbates overconfidence bias, 
and report that high information uncertainty brings more PEAD than low information 
uncertainty.  My study attempts to reconcile these conflicting results.  
 
2.2.3 Analyst Forecasts Dispersion and Information Uncertainty 
In accounting research, analyst forecast dispersion is popularly measured 
using the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts.  Some studies use the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings uncertainty (e.g., Imhoff and 
Lobo, 1992; Clement, Frankel, and Miller, 2003), assuming that the standard 
deviation reflects uncertainty about the future economic performance of a firm.  This 
assumption seems to fit with one’s intuition at first glance.  However, besides 
information uncertainty, analyst forecast dispersion is also influenced by 
disagreement among analysts due to their own private information.    
Based on the assumption that each analyst observes two signals about future 
earnings – one public (common across all analysts) and one private (idiosyncratic to 
each analyst) – Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) provide a more detailed and 
comprehensive picture about the relations among forecast dispersion, errors in the 
mean forecast, analyst uncertainty, and consensus (that is, the degree to which 
analysts share a common belief).  Instead of simply regarding forecast dispersion as a 
proxy for uncertainty, they show uncertainty can be measured by combining forecast 
dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts.  
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Barron et al. (1998) disaggregate analyst forecast dispersion into uncertainty 
and heterogeneous information, which is a reverse of consensus.  Moreover, they 
show that forecast dispersion is an increasing function of uncertainty but a decreasing 
function of consensus: 
)1( ρ−= VD ,          (1) 
where D is dispersion, V is analyst uncertainty, and ρ  is a measure of consensus.  
The degree of consensus, which is denoted by ρ , is the correlation in forecast 
errors across analysts, and it estimates how much the average (mean) belief reflects 
common versus private information.  When all available information is common, all 
analysts’ beliefs are identical and ρ =1.  As ρ  approaches zero, the amount of 
private information rises and analysts’ beliefs diverge more from the average belief.  
Thus, they use (1– ρ ) to proxy for the amount of private information or 
heterogeneous information among analysts.  
On the other hand, analyst uncertainty, which is another component of analyst 
forecast dispersion and noted as V, is the squared error in individual forecasts 
averaged across analysts.  This is based on the fact that when analysts are uncertain 
about a firm’s future performance, they tend to have larger forecast errors.  The 
following equations show measures of heterogeneous information and uncertainty 
according to Barron et al. (1998).  Dispersion (D) in analysts’ forecasts is calculated 
















,         (2) 
where fi is the earnings forecast by analyst i, f is the mean forecast across analysts, 
and N is the number of forecasts.  SE is defined as the squared error in the mean 
forecast, 
2)( fySE −= ,      (3) 
where y is the actual earnings and f is the mean forecast.  Barron et al. (1998) finally 
show that consensus ( ρ ) and analyst uncertainty (V) can be expressed by using 
properties of the available earnings forecast data:6  







/ρ  ,     (4) 
SED
N
V +−= )11(        (5) 
I take away two insights from Barron et al. (1998).  First, the use of simple 
forecast dispersion as a proxy for information uncertainty is not perfect, and 
information uncertainty can be measured more precisely by also considering forecast 
errors and the number of forecasts.  Second, the timing of forecast collection matters 
when measuring forecast dispersion and/or forecast errors because the influence of 
public and private information on analysts’ forecasts varies over time.  For example, 
a forecast that is made immediately after an earnings announcement is heavily based 
on announced public earnings news, while a forecast that is made quite awhile after 
                                                 
6 See Barron et al. (1998) for proofs and detailed explanations.  
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the earnings announcement is more likely to be influenced by private information 
than the public earnings news.   
I believe that the latter insight that I draw from Barron et al. (1998) – that the 
timing of forecast collection matters – is an important issue, but it has been neglected 
in prior research.  For example, although Liang (2003) uses Barron et al.’s (1998) 
methodology to measure the information uncertainty surrounding quarterly earnings 
announcements, she does not consider that forecasts that are made before the earnings 
announcement  might have very different characteristics from the forecasts which are 
made immediately after the earnings announcement – she chose latest forecast within 
forecast window (−45, −1) for pre-announcement forecasts and chose first forecast 
within forecast window (1, 30) for post-announcement updated forecasts, where 0 is 
the quarterly earnings announcement date.7  I continue to discuss this issue in the 
following chapter.  
 
                                                 
7 Although she used forecast window of (1, 30) for the post-announcement forecasts, the majority of 
forecasts are made immediately after the earnings announcement.  See Table 5.  
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
3.1 The Importance of Reconciliation of Prior Research 
The previous chapter presented two opposing explanations about the relation 
between information uncertainty and PEAD, and selected prior empirical results 
support each explanation.  I attempt to reconcile the conflicting empirical results, and 
this is an important issue for several reasons.  First, a negative relation between 
information uncertainty and PEAD runs counter to the widely held belief that more 
objective (or more reliable) information increases market efficiency.  Prior empirical 
studies show that large firms, which disclose more information than small firms, have 
less PEAD (Foster et al., 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Freeman and Tse, 1989).  
PEAD declines with the level of institutional holdings (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and 
Krinsky, 2000).  Firms providing additional information using conference calls are 
reported to have less PEAD (Kimbrough, 2005).  If large firms, firms favored by 
institutions, and firms providing conference calls have lower information uncertainty 
(i.e., the uncertainty about the implication of an earnings announcement for future 
earnings is lower) than small firms, firms avoided by institutional investors, and firms 
without conference calls, then prior evidence that PEAD decreases with information 
uncertainty seems puzzling.8  
                                                 
8 Although indirectly related to PEAD, many studies also show that individual firms benefit from 
lowering information uncertainty.  For example, Botosan (1997) finds that high level of disclosure 
reduces cost of capital.  Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004, 2005) find that high quality 
earnings (or accruals) reduce cost of capital.  Therefore, the argument that low information uncertainty 
increases PEAD can be interpreted as indicating that low information uncertainty is good for 
individual firms but bad for market efficiency.  This interpretation also seems counter-intuitive.    
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Second, this study provides insight on why PEAD exists.  If information 
uncertainty and PEAD are positively associated, Daniel et al.’s (1998) and Jiang et 
al.’s (2005) explanation (which attributes PEAD to overconfidence in private 
information and self-attribution) is supported by the evidence.  In contrast, if 
information uncertainty and PEAD are negatively associated, Barberis et al. (1998) 
and Griffin and Tversky (1992)’s theory (which attributes PEAD to conservatism bias 
and bias about ‘strength and weight’) seems to be supported by the evidence.9  
Although showing the positive or negative relation is not sufficient to fully answer 
what drives PEAD, it moves us closer to understanding the reason(s) PEAD exists. 
In this study, I claim that the conflicting results noted above are due to 
inappropriate proxies for information uncertainty used in Dische (2002) and Liang 
(2003).  Dische (2002) uses analyst forecast dispersion itself, 10 and Liang (2003) 
uses Barron et al.’s (1998) model to measure analyst uncertainty.  I argue that neither 
of the studies is successful in extracting information uncertainty from analysts’ 
forecasts.  This failure to correctly measure information uncertainty leads to an 
incorrect negative association between information uncertainty and PEAD.  
                                                 
9 This statement is valid only when the uncertainty measure is an appropriate proxy for the ‘weight’ of 
new evidence.  Whether Dische (2002) and Liang (2003) properly operationaize the weight of new 
evidence is an issue, which is not covered in this study.  If the uncertainty measure is not a good proxy 
for the weight of new evidence, the positive association between uncertainty and PEAD (which is the 
finding of this study) cannot reject the PEAD explanations of Barberis et al. (1998) and Griffin and 
Tversky (1992).   
10 Although Dische (2002) adheres to the terminology of ‘dispersion in analyst forecasts,’ he also 
states that dispersion can serve as a proxy for earnings uncertainty (pp. 221).   
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Specifically, neither study considers the fact that the characteristics of analysts’ 
forecasts change drastically over time.  
 
3.2 Two Sources of Information: Public and Private 
There are several reasons why the timing of forecast collection matters when 
information uncertainty is measured using analysts’ forecasts.  First, as Barron et al. 
(1998) identify, analysts have two sets of information; one is public information, and 
the other is private.  The influence of each information set on analysts’ forecasts 
changes over time.  Liang (2003) compares the latest earnings forecasts made within 
forty five days before the earnings announcement with the first forecasts made within 
thirty days after the earnings announcement to measure information uncertainty.  She 
examines the change of forecast errors between the two forecast groups, and she 
argues that analyst uncertainty declines as forecast errors decrease.  However, I argue 
that Liang’s comparison forecast groups are an inappropriate match.  The forecasts 
made before the earnings announcement incorporate all the available public and 
private information because those forecasts are made at least a month after the 
previous quarterly earnings announcement.  In contrast, the forecasts made 
immediately after earnings announcements are heavily influenced by the 
interpretation of public information.  One may argue that the forecasts after earnings 
announcements reflect all the public and private information available.  However, I 
expect that the influence of the private information is minimal immediately after 
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major public announcements such as earnings announcements.  Therefore, I expect 
that analyst forecast dispersion measured immediately after an earnings 
announcement will be much lower than analyst forecast dispersion measured before 
the earnings announcement.11  
 
3.3 Analysts’ Concern about Forecast Timeliness 
Another reason why the timing of forecast collection matters is that analysts 
may try to provide timely forecasts even at the cost of forecast accuracy.  Clement 
and Tse (2003) find that investors value forecast timeliness in addition to forecast 
accuracy.  Therefore, it is difficult to deny that analysts, who have investors as their 
customers, pay attention to timeliness of their forecasts.  Analysts may sacrifice 
forecast accuracy to make timelier forecasts.  If this is true, analysts’ forecasts made 
before an earnings announcement, which are motivated primarily by forecast 
accuracy, are not fully compatible with the forecasts made immediately after the 




                                                 
11 Shortened forecast horizon is another reason to lower analyst forecast dispersion.  However, I expect 
that the influence of the public announcement on forecast dispersion is greater than the influence of the 
shortened forecast horizon.  In fact, I find that the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts made several days 
after an earnings announcement (using forecast window (6, 45)) is higher than the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts made immediately after the earnings announcement (using forecast window (0, 5)), 
even though the forecast horizon is shorter.  See Table 6 and Figure 5. 
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3.4 Market Reaction to Earnings News and Analysts’ Forecasts   
Finally, I claim that abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcements, 
which are the market’s initial response to the earnings news, influence analysts’ 
forecasts, and I argue that this influence is greater when the forecasts are made soon 
after earnings announcements.  
My assertion about the influence of the abnormal returns on analysts’ 
forecasts stems from recent studies that investigate why investors and analysts chase 
return trends (Alti, Kaniel, and Yoeli, 2006; Miller and Sedor, 2006).  Alti et al. 
(2006) analytically show that when investors face uncertainty about their private 
information, they wait for subsequent confirming news from the market before 
establishing a stock position.  Through their experiment, Miller and Sedor (2006) also 
obtain supportive results: when uncertainty about future earnings is high, analysts’ 
earnings forecast revisions are influenced by observed stock price changes.   
The results from these studies (Alti, et al., 2006; Miller and Sedor, 2006) shed 
light on the relation between earnings surprises and analysts’ forecasts.  When 
earnings surprise is measured by the difference between announced earnings and the 
mean analysts’ forecast, a big earnings surprise means that analysts have not made 
accurate earnings predictions.  Possible explanations for this large forecast error 
include that analysts missed some important public information or they did not have 
good private information.  In either explanation, big earnings surprises reflect an 
inability to make accurate forecasts.   
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What would rational analysts do when encountering a large difference 
between their earnings forecast and actual earnings?  Following Alti et al. (2006) and 
Miller and Sedor (2006), I infer that analysts are more likely to pay attention to the 
market’s response to the earnings surprise than otherwise.  Therefore, analyst forecast 
revisions are more likely to be influenced by abnormal returns surrounding earnings 
announcement dates.  Specifically, I hypothesize that when the market confirms a 
large earnings surprise, there is smaller forecast dispersion than otherwise.   
This observation is important because even though true analyst uncertainty of 
big earnings surprise firms might be the same, the calibrated analyst uncertainty 
could be different if analyst forecast dispersion is used as a proxy for information 
uncertainty.12  In summary, I argue that the influence of the abnormal returns 
surrounding earnings announcement dates on analyst forecast revisions may distort 
the true information uncertainty to which investors are exposed.    
The first hypothesis is the summary of my last assertion about the relation 
between abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcements and analyst forecast 
dispersion.      
 
 
                                                 
12 This argument is a complement of previous research by Morse, Stephen, and Stice (1991).  Morse et 
al. (1991) show that there is greater forecast dispersion when the difference between announced 
earnings and forecasted earnings is larger.  However, I expect that not all the large earnings surprise 
firms have large forecast dispersion, and that if the market confirms the large earnings surprise, there is 
smaller forecast dispersion than otherwise.  In other words, forecast dispersion of large earnings 
surprise firms depends on the market’s response to the news.   
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H1:  When large earnings surprises occur (based on forecast errors),  analyst 
forecast dispersion is lower for firms with confirming abnormal returns 




3.5 Herding Behavior and Forecast Timeliness 
The next hypothesis deals the relation between the timing of the data 
collection and analyst forecast dispersion more directly.  I have argued that 
comparisons of analysts’ forecasts made before earnings announcements and 
forecasts made immediately after earnings announcements may lead to biased 
measures of information uncertainty.  To overcome this problem and match the 
comparison groups of analysts’ forecasts, I designed an alternative measure of 
information uncertainty – instead of using analysts’ forecasts made immediately after 
earnings announcements, I collected analysts’ forecasts at least five days after 
earnings announcements.   
My “late forecast” measure could be influenced by analysts’ “herding” 
behavior (Trueman, 1994), however.  Trueman (1994) and many other following 
studies (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005) show that 
analysts have a motivation not to reveal their own private information but to 
demonstrate herding behavior.  In these studies, later forecasts are more likely to be 
affected by herding, and the first movers are more likely to use their private 
information in predicting future earnings of the firm.   
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I claim, however, that early forecasts right after the earnings announcement 
may not necessarily be based on analysts’ private information.  First, the early 
forecasts could be the result of the heavy influence of public earnings information, 
i.e., earnings news is weighted too much, while private information is weighted too 
little.  Second, early forecasts could be the result of analysts’ reliance on the market’s 
response to the earnings news, which is more likely to happen when the difference 
between forecasted earnings and actual earnings is large, as discussed earlier.  Third, 
early forecasts after earnings announcements could be the result of merely following 
the forecasts made one or two days earlier by other analysts.  I call this “early 
herding” to distinguish it from the original herding behavior proposed by previous 
studies.  These three examples would cause lower dispersion of early forecasts than 
of late forecasts.  Note that as posited in Barron et al. (1998), analyst forecast 
dispersion is one of the variables that determine the level of information 
uncertainty.13  Therefore, a failure to consider the changing pattern of the forecast 
dispersion would result in a biased measure of information uncertainty. 
I expect that if analysts feel pressure to make timely forecasts, as I inferred 
from Clement and Tse (2003), analysts’ forecasts are more likely to be made by 
following one or more of these examples than to be made by using their private 
information.  The analysts’ strategy of following the above-mentioned examples, 
                                                 
13 Strictly speaking, Barron et al.’s (1998) analyst uncertainty measure is squared error in individual 
forecasts averaged across analysts. However, this measure is indeed influenced by analyst forecast 
dispersion.   
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instead of following their own private information, seems to be rational, especially to 
the analysts who are able to update their forecasts later without being penalized for 
earlier inaccurate forecasts.  Overall, I conclude that analysts’ strategic forecasting 
decisions cause forecast updates soon after earnings announcements to be 
inappropriate measures of information uncertainty.   
In contrast, forecasts updated several days after earnings announcements are 
more likely to be the result of full incorporation of public and private information and 
are more likely to be free from the market’s response and “early herding” behavior.  
In summary, I expect that the dispersion of the late updated forecasts will be larger 
than the dispersion of the early updated forecasts.  Based on discussions so far, my 
second hypothesis can be formally stated as follows:   
 
H2:  The dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts updated immediately after 
earnings announcements is lower than the dispersion of the analysts’ 
forecasts updated several days after earnings announcements.  
 
Figure 2 summarizes and contrasts hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.  The last 
column of the figure indicates the effects of confirming versus non-confirming 
returns on forecast dispersion (hypothesis 1), and the last row depicts the effects of 
forecast timing on forecast dispersion (hypothesis 2).  
Finally, I examine the relation between PEAD and information uncertainty 
measured through analysts’ forecasts.  As discussed above, I argue that previous 
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research has failed to consider analysts’ motivations to follow environmental factors, 
such as the market’s response to earnings news and the early herding, rather than 
using their own private information.  To control for these factors, I propose that late 
updated forecasts provide more accurate measures of information uncertainty than 
early updated forecasts.  I suspect that use of early updated forecasts distort the true 
relation between information uncertainty and PEAD.  I hypothesize that PEAD is 
positively associated with information uncertainty, after controlling for the factors 
that distort information uncertainty measured using early analysts’ forecasts.  
 
H3:  There is a positive association between information uncertainty and 
PEAD, i.e., firms with higher information uncertainty have more PEAD 
than firms with lower information uncertainty.    
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Sample Selection 
4.1 Research Design 
The basic research design of this paper is the same as Liang (2003)’s, but I 
modify the design to control for the factors that contaminate analysts’ forecasts as a 
measure of information uncertainty.  I apply Barron et al.’s (1998) analytic 
framework to measure information uncertainty (V), using three variables: forecast 
dispersion, mean forecast error, and number of forecasts. 
SED
N
V +−= )11( ,      (5) 
where D is the sample variance of the forecasts,  SE is the squared error of the mean 
forecast, and N is the number of forecasts.  I use the change in information 
uncertainty (ΔV) as the measure of the information uncertainty associated with an 
earnings announcement, where ΔV is information uncertainty after the earnings 
announcement (V_after) minus information uncertainty before the earnings 
announcement (V_before). 
I do not use fixed point forecasts because they do not consider the 
idiosyncratic differences of information uncertainty among firms.  In other words, 
certain firms have higher information uncertainty than other firms, making it more 
difficult for analysts to predict the firms’ future earnings.  For example, firms that 
have just begun their businesses or firms in high-tech industries are likely to have 
higher information uncertainty than firms that are at a mature stage in the business 
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cycle or firms in relatively stable industries.  Through change in information 
uncertainty, I control for this firm specific information uncertainty and measure the 
extent to which information environment is affected by the quarterly earnings 
announcement.14   
 One-year and two-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts are used for the 
calculation of forecast dispersion (D), mean forecast error (SE), and the number of 
forecasts (N) as in Liang (2003).  One-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts are used 
for the calculations surrounding the first-, second-, and the third-quarter earnings 
announcements.  Two-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts are used for the 
calculation before the fourth-quarter earnings announcement and one-year-ahead 
annual earnings forecasts are used for the calculation after the fourth-quarter earnings 
announcement.  For example, one-year-ahead annual forecasts made before the first 
quarterly earnings announcement are used for the calculation of V_before, and the 
one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts made after the first quarterly earnings 
announcement are used for the calculation of V_after. The same procedure is applied 
through the third quarterly earnings announcement.  Two-year-ahead annual earnings 
forecasts made before the fourth quarterly earnings announcement are used for the 
calculation of V_before, but one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts made after the 
fourth quarterly earnings announcement are used for the calculation of V_after.  
                                                 
14 I also conducted tests using the level of uncertainty (i.e., fixed point forecasts) instead of the change 
of uncertainty.  The level of uncertainty also showed a positive association with PEAD but only in a 
limited situation, which is discussed more in the supplemental tests chapter. 
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Figure 3 illustrates analysts’ forecasts and forecast horizons used for the research 
design.  
Using one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts is a compromise 
of theoretical correctness and practical feasibility.  Theoretically, long-term forecasts 
are more price relevant than short-term forecasts (Liu and Thomas, 2000; Frankel and 
Lee, 1998).  However, long-term forecasts such as three- to five-year-ahead annual 
earnings forecasts or long-term growth rate forecasts are not updated very often.  In 
contrast, quarterly earnings forecasts are frequently updated but are less value 
relevant.  Therefore, I use one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead annual earnings 
forecasts, which are not too short sighted and are frequently updated by analysts.  
I compare two different measures of standardized earnings surprise (SUE).  
One is measured by analysts’ forecast errors, which is the difference between 
reported quarterly earnings and the mean of the quarterly earnings forecasts made 
within forty five days before the earnings announcement; this is denoted by 
SUE_AFE.  I use the most recent forecast if the same analyst updates quarterly 
earnings forecasts within the forty-five day period.  The difference is scaled by the 
closing stock price on the forty-fifth day before the earnings announcement.  If the 
number of quarterly earnings forecasts made for firm-quarters is less than two, the 
firm-quarters are dropped from the sample.  If the stock price on the forty-fifth day 
before the earnings announcement is lower than $1.00, the firm-quarters are also 
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excluded from the sample.15  My other standardized earnings surprise is cumulative 
three-day abnormal returns surrounding a quarterly earnings announcement date       
(-1, 1); this is denoted by SUE_RET.  The daily abnormal return for firm j on day t 
(ARjt) is computed as the difference between the daily return of firm j and the mean 
return of a firm-size decile that firm j is a member: 
ARjt = Rjt – Rpt ,  
where Rjt is the daily raw return for firm j on day t and Rpt is the equally weighted 
mean return on day t of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm size decile.   
 For V_before measurement, I use annual earnings forecasts made within forty 
five days before quarterly earnings announcements.  If the same analyst makes 
several forecasts in the period, the latest forecast is used for the measurement.  For 
V_after measurement, I use annual earnings forecasts made within forty five days 
after quarterly earnings announcements.  However, annual earnings forecasts made 
during the first five days after announcement dates are not used for the sample.  The 
reason not to use the first five-day forecasts (i.e., early updated forecasts) is explained 
in Chapter 3.  Again, if the same analyst updates forecasts more than once in the 
period, the latest forecast is used for the V_after measurement, and the measurement 
is scaled by the closing stock price on the forty-fifth day before the earnings 
announcement.  Figure 4 illustrates forecast collections around quarterly earnings 
announcement dates.  
                                                 
15 As a sensitivity analysis, I tested a minimum of $5.00, and the result was almost identical with $1.00 
minimum case.  
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To test the hypothesis about the relation between information uncertainty and 
PEAD, I use a regression model with interaction terms, similar to the model used in 
Bhushan (1994), and Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000).  The interaction 
terms indicate whether the interacted variables have incremental effects on PEAD in 
addition to standardized earnings surprise.  










jq is abnormal returns accumulated from day 2 to day 60 for the firm 
j after q quarterly earnings announcement.16  SUE_AFEjq is the firm j’s standardized 
unexpected earnings measured by analysts’ forecast errors at the quarter q earnings 
announcement.  ΔVjq is the firm j’s change of information uncertainty around its 
quarter q earnings announcement, and CONTROLjqi represents control variables that 
prior research has found to affect PEAD.   
 
4.2 Sample Selection 
 I collected both quarterly and annual earnings forecasts from the Institutional 
Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) from 1989 to 2005.  I chose 1989 as the first 
year of the sample collection because Barron and Stuerke (1998) report that dating of 
I/B/E/S forecasts before the late 1980s are not reliable.  I calculated the mean forecast, 
the variance of the forecasts, and the number of analysts using the Unadjusted Detail 
History files to avoid split-adjustment errors caused by rounding (Baber and Kang, 
                                                 
16 I accumulated abnormal returns from day 2 instead of day 1, because in some cases day 1 is the first 
day that actual trading is possible after encountering an earnings announcement.   
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2002; Diether et al., 2002).  I calculated analyst forecast errors using actual quarterly 
and annual earnings from the Unadjusted Detail History Actuals files.17  I used the 
Compustat combined quarterly files to validate earnings announcement dates, and 
excluded firm-quarters when the I/B/E/S quarterly earnings announcement date did 
not match with the Compustat announcement date.  I referred to the Center for 
Research in Security Price (CRSP) to get daily stock prices, daily raw returns, daily 
size adjusted returns, trading volumes, and the number of shares outstanding. 
 Table 1 shows the number of firm-quarters used in this study and their 
distribution over time.  The final number of qualified firm-quarters is 23,740.  Panel 
B of Table 1 shows that the number of observations for the fourth quarter (2,107) is 
smaller than the number of observations for the first, second, and third quarters.  The 
relatively low number of fourth-quarter observations is caused by requiring at least a 
sixty-day interval between quarterly earnings announcement dates, and the interval 
between the fourth-quarter earnings announcement date and the first-quarter earnings 
announcement date of the next fiscal year is often less than sixty days.  
I transformed all independent variables into deciles, based on their sample 
distributions within calendar quarters – zero represents the smallest decile of each 
variable and nine represents the largest.  I scaled deciles by nine to range between 
                                                 
17 Using unadjusted forecasts and actual earnings is another distinction from Liang (2003) who used 
adjusted numbers.  Since Barron et al.’s (1998) measure of uncertainty is mean ‘squared’ error of 
individual forecasts, the uncertainty measured using adjusted numbers and scaled by adjusted stock 
prices is always lower than the uncertainty measured using unadjusted numbers and scaled by 
unadjusted stock prices.  Therefore, Liang (2003) underestimates information uncertainty for stocks 
with adjustment factors (i.e., stocks with stock splits and/or stock dividends).   
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zero and one to make the coefficients easy to be interpreted in the regression results, 
i.e., the coefficient represents zero investment portfolio returns from short positions 
in the smallest decile and long positions in the largest decile portfolios (Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989).  I used 99% winsorization for all the independent variables, i.e., the 
bottom 0.5% of the values were set equal to the value corresponding to the 0.5th 
percentile, while the upper 0.5% of the values were set equal to the value 
corresponding to the 99.5th percentile.18   
 
                                                 
18 The purpose of using winsorization was to control for outliers when examining descriptive statistics 
and correlations among variables. The winsorization did not affect regression results because all 
independent variables were transformed into deciles.   
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
5.1 Sample Description 
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample.  The mean of the 
cumulative abnormal returns from the first through the sixtieth day (CAR_2_60) after 
the earnings announcement date is −0.99%.  The mean of the standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE_AFE) measured using the difference between announced 
earnings and the mean analyst forecast is −0.00055, which reflects analysts’ forecast 
optimism.  Both the mean (−0.01105) and median (−0.00074) of the change of 
uncertainty (ΔV) are negative, which means that information uncertainty decreases 
over time, i.e., it is lower after the quarterly earnings announcement than before.  The 
mean number of analysts (4.54) and the mean firm size ($7,874 million) are relatively 
large because I require that at least two analysts make forecasts both before and after 
quarterly earnings announcements, and relatively large firms are more likely to meet 
this condition.  
 Panel B of Table 2 shows the correlations between main variables.  The 
Spearman correlation coefficients show that cumulative abnormal returns after the 
earnings announcement (CAR_2_60) are positively correlated with both SUE_AFE 
and SUE_RET, which confirms the general PEAD phenomenon.  The negative 
correlation between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR_2_60) and forecasts 
dispersion (DISP) is consistent with prior studies which show that stocks with lower 
analyst forecast dispersion have higher stock returns (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Diether et 
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al., 2002; Dische, 2002).  Information uncertainty measured after the quarterly 
earnings announcement (V) is also negatively associated with CAR_2_60.  However, 
the change in information uncertainty (ΔV), the main variable that I am interested in, 
shows a significantly positive association with cumulative abnormal returns after the 
earnings announcement (CAR_2_60).  The change in information uncertainty (ΔV) is 
also positively associated with both SUE_AFE and SUE_RET.  
 Table 3 shows average cumulative return drift after quarterly earnings 
announcement dates.  I rank earnings surprises to make decile portfolios within 
calendar quarters where the earnings announcement date belongs.  CAR_2_60 based 
on either SUE_AFE (represented in the third column) or SUE_RET (represented in 
the fifth column) shows a weaker pattern of PEAD than CAR_1_60 based on 
SUE_AFE deciles (represented in the second column).  Overall, the results 
demonstrated in Table 3 show that larger positive (negative) earnings surprises are 
associated with larger positive (negative) drift, whichever earnings surprise measure 
is used for portfolio construction.   
 
5.2 Test of Hypothesis 1: Sensitivity of Forecast Dispersion to the Market’s 
Response 
I expect that analysts incorporate the market’s response surrounding earnings 
announcements when updating their earnings forecasts, and I also expect that this 
behavior is conspicuous when there are large earnings surprises.  Specifically, the 
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first hypothesis is that when large earnings surprises occur, analyst forecast 
dispersion is lower for firms with confirming abnormal returns surrounding the 
earnings announcement than for firms without confirming abnormal returns.  
Table 4 summarizes the pattern of analyst forecast dispersion across earnings 
surprise ranks.19  First, Panel A of Table 4 shows the general distributions of analyst 
forecast dispersion (DISP) – which are measured using annual earnings forecasts 
made after earnings announcements – and change of information uncertainty (ΔV) 
across SUE_AFE deciles (the left half of the columns) and SUE_RET deciles (the 
right half of the columns), respectively.  The lowest and the highest SUE_AFE 
deciles have greater forecast dispersion than mid-range SUE_AFE deciles; forecast 
dispersion of the lowest (highest) SUE_AFE is 0.0047 (0.0041).  The lowest and the 
highest SUE_AFE deciles consequently have more change of information uncertainty 
(ΔV) than mid-range SUE_AFE deciles; change of information uncertainty of the 
lowest (highest) SUE_AFE is −0.0453 (−0.0221).  However, the right half of the 
columns in Panel A show that this pattern is much weaker when SUE_RET deciles 
are used, although the lowest and the highest deciles have relatively large forecast 
dispersion and change of information uncertainty compared to mid-range SUE_RET 
deciles.  In sum, the results of Panel A imply that the distribution of analyst forecast 
                                                 
19 Note that unlike the final sample used for sample descriptions and the final regression analysis, the 
forecasts used in Table 4 include forecasts updated early after earnings announcements, i.e., forecast 
window (0, 45) instead of (6, 45), where 0 is the earnings announcement date.  In the first and second 




dispersion is quite different between SUE_AFE and SUE_RET, although both 
measures are regarded as interchangeable standardized unexpected earnings measures.   
 Panel B of Table 4 shows test results of H1.  It shows that when forecast 
errors are held constant, analyst forecast dispersion changes according to the market’s 
responses to the forecast errors.  The twenty-five portfolios of analyst forecast 
dispersion are constructed by using a combination of SUE_AFE quintiles and 
SUE_RET quintiles.  The second to last row (labeled SUE_AFE Quintile 5) shows 
that when there are large positive forecast errors, analyst forecast dispersion 
decreases monotonically as the market’s response becomes more positive (from 
0.0047 to 0.0026).  Analyst forecasts dispersion is greatest when the two earnings 
surprise measures reach the highest level of disagreement.  Dispersion is 0.0047 for 
observations in SUE_AFE Quintile 5 and SUE_RET Quintile 1 – row 5 column 1 of 
Panel B.  Similarly, in row 1 column 5, dispersion is 0.0046.  Note that when there 
are large positive forecast errors, the market is likely to show large positive returns.  
Consequently, the number of observations increases from 935 (at SUE_AFE 5 and 
SUE_RET 1) to 2,507 (at SUE_AFE 5 and SUE_RET 5).  The average return drift of 
the portfolio formed by SUE_AFE 5 and SUE_RET 5 is greater than the average 
return drift of the portfolio formed by SUE_AFE 5 and SUE_RET 1.20  Therefore, a 
regression of the return drift on analyst forecast dispersion is likely to show a 
                                                 
20 Untabulated results show that the portfolio formed by SUE_AFE 5 and SUE_RET 5 has 9.87% 
cumulative abnormal return over the next 60 days after earnings announcements, while the portfolio 
formed by SUE_AFE 5 and SUE_RET 1 has -5.87% cumulative abnormal returns on average.  
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negative association between them.  However, as shown in Panel B of Table 4, the 
small forecast dispersion could be a mere reflection of analysts following of the 
market’s response to earnings news.  In sum, these results imply that analyst forecast 
dispersion may not be a good proxy for information uncertainty. 
 I argue that a better measure of information uncertainty (or a measure which 
is less influenced by the market’s response) is to use analysts’ forecasts updated late 
after the earnings announcement.  The next section considers whether the use of late 
updated forecasts lessen the problem of the sensitivity of forecast dispersion to the 
market’s response.  
 
5.3 Test of Hypothesis 2: Difference of Forecast Dispersions between Forecast 
Window (0, 5) and Forecast Window (6, 45) 
The second hypothesis is about whether forecast dispersion varies depending 
on the timing of forecasts.  I hypothesize that the dispersion of early updated 
forecasts after an earnings announcement is lower than the dispersion of late updated 
forecasts after the announcement.  This hypothesis is directly related to the research 
method chosen to investigate H3, and the test results show why the late updated 
forecasts are appropriate forecasts to measure information uncertainty.  
Before testing the second hypothesis, I first examine analysts’ forecast 
updating pattern in general, and Table 5 summarizes the results.  First of all, note that 
the number of observations in this examination is different from the final firm-quarter 
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observations, because this test examines the updating behavior of all the analysts.  
The sample includes 397,432 analysts who made one-year-ahead annual earnings 
forecasts within forty-five days before the quarterly earnings announcement date 
(two-year-ahead annual earnings forecast before the fourth-quarter earnings 
announcement date).  The table reports how soon (Panel A) and how often (Panel B) 
analysts update their annual earnings forecasts within forty-five days after the 
quarterly earnings announcement.21   
Panel A of Table 5 shows how soon analysts update their forecasts.  About 
5% of the analysts update their forecasts on the same day as the quarterly earnings 
announcement, and the next day is the most congested with forecast updates; about 
28% of the updates are concentrated on this single day.  More than half of the updates 
have been made by the end of the third day after the earnings announcement, and the 
number of updates made on each day decreases drastically afterwards. Only one or 
two percent of the updates are made each day near the end of the forty-five day post 
announcement period.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows how many times analysts update earnings forecasts 
within forty-five days after the quarterly earnings announcement date.  The majority 
of forecasts (65%) are updated only once during this period, about 26% of the 
forecasts updated twice, and less than ten percent of the forecasts are updated more 
than twice.  In sum, Table 5 confirms that analysts care about the timeliness of their 
                                                 
21 Strictly speaking, 397,432 sample observations are not the number of analysts but the number of 
analyst-firm-quarters.   
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forecast updates, and the majority of the forecasts are updated within three days after 
earnings announcements, which are used in Liang’s (2003) measure of information 
uncertainty.   
I examine, as a next step, whether there is a difference in the dispersion and 
the change of information uncertainty between the early updated forecasts and the 
late updated forecasts.   Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of the comparison 
between the two groups of forecasts: one group is based on the forecasts made within 
five days after the earnings announcement (DISP_0_5, and ΔV_0_5) and the other 
group is based on the forecasts made between the sixth day and the forty-fifth day 
after the announcement (DISP_6_45, and ΔV_6_45).  The last row shows that on 
average the dispersion of the late updated forecasts (0.0043) is significantly larger 
than the dispersion of the early updated forecasts (0.0015) at the level of 0.01, and 
that there is more change in information uncertainty (i.e., larger absolute values) in 
late updated forecasts (−0.0115) than in early updated forecasts (−0.009).  
Among SUE_AFE deciles, five deciles, including the lowest and the highest 
deciles, have significantly greater forecast dispersion for late forecasts relative to 
early forecasts.  As for change of information uncertainty, the difference between the 
two groups is significantly large when forecast errors are positive (SUE_AFE 6 
through SUE_AFE 9).  
One may argue that the different levels of dispersion (D) do not necessarily 
result in different levels of information uncertainty (V) because information 
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uncertainty is also dependent on the squared error of the mean forecast (SE).  Note 
that SED
N
V +−= )11( .  If SE moves to the opposite direction of the change of 
dispersion and compromises the influence of D on V, there would be no change in 
information uncertainty resulting from the change of dispersion.  Therefore, in order 
to determine whether the different levels of dispersion between early updated and late 
updated forecast groups result in different information uncertainty (V),  I examine 
information uncertainty (V) and squared error of the mean forecast (SE) of the early 
updated and the late updated forecast groups separately.  Panel B of Table 6 shows 
the results.  The last row shows that the late updated forecast group has significantly 
greater information uncertainty (0.0613) than the early updated forecast group 
(0.0274).  The differences of the information uncertainty between the two groups are 
concentrated in the extreme deciles of the standardized unexpected earnings 
(SUE_AFE 1 and SUE_AFE 10).  However, there is no significant difference in the 
squared error of the mean forecast between the early updated and the late updated 
forecast groups.  The last row shows that SE of the early (late) updated forecast group 
is 0.0563 (0.0582), and that the difference in SE is not significant.  In sum, I conclude 
that there is a significant difference in information uncertainty between early updated 
and late updated forecast groups, and this is caused by differences in the analyst 
forecast dispersion between the two groups. 
Panel C and D of Table 6 show the difference of the sensitivity of the change 
of information uncertainty to the market’s response (i.e., SUE_RET) between early 
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updated forecasts group (Panel C of Table 6) and late updated forecasts group (Panel 
D of Table 6).  Panel C shows that in four of the five rows, the difference of change 
of uncertainty between SUE_RET 1 and SUE_RET 5 is greater than the difference in 
the corresponding row of Panel D.  In Panel D, except for SUE_AFE Quintile 4 row, 
there is no significant difference of change of uncertainty between SUE_RET 1 and 
SUE_RET 5.  These results indicate that change of information uncertainty is more 
influenced by the market’s response for early updated forecasts group than for late 
updated forecasts group.22     
Figure 5 shows the changing pattern of the mean analyst forecast dispersion 
(Panel A) and mean change of uncertainty (Panel B) over one year forecast horizons 
when forecasts are grouped using forecast window (0, 5) and (6, 45) alternately.  
Forecast dispersion decreases as forecast horizon becomes short.  However, it does 
not decrease monotonically.  Dispersion of the late updated forecasts (i.e., forecast 
window (6, 45)) is larger than the dispersion of the early updated forecasts (i.e., 
forecast window (0, 5)), although late updated forecasts have shorter forecast 
horizons than early updated forecasts.  Similarly, Panel B shows that absolute value 
of change of uncertainty decreases (i.e., less change of uncertainty) as forecast 
horizon becomes short.  However, there is more change of uncertainty (i.e., larger 
absolute value of change of uncertainty) of forecast window (6, 45) than for the case 
                                                 
22 Similarly, untabulated test results also show that the dispersion of the early updates are much more 




of forecast window (0, 5), although late updated forecasts have shorter forecast 
horizon than early updated forecasts.   
In summary, the results of Table 6 and Figure 5 support my second hypothesis, 
and I conclude that the dispersion of the late updated forecasts is larger than the 
dispersion of the early updated forecasts.  Moreover, the results indicate that when 
using forecasts updated late, analysts’ forecasts are not as sensitive to the market’s 
response as in the case of early updated forecasts.  Therefore, I infer that information 
uncertainty can be measured more accurately with the use of late updated forecasts.  
 
5.4 Test of Hypothesis 3: Regression Result 
 Finally, I examine whether the change of information uncertainty (ΔV) has a 
positive incremental effect on PEAD.  Table 7 reports results of various regressions 
that examine whether forecast collection timing makes a difference in the incremental 
effects of change of information uncertainty on PEAD.  Panel A and Panel B of Table 
7 use the forecast window (0, 5), which represents early updated forecasts.  Panel A 
reports the regression results when independent variables are limited to the change of 
information uncertainty (ΔV) and the earnings surprise measure.  Panel B shows the 
regression results when control variables are added.  Panel C and Panel D of Table 7 
report results for forecast window (6, 45), which represents late updated forecasts.   
 I control for firm size, which is known to decrease the influence of the 
earnings surprise on returns (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987).  To calculate firm size 
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(SIZE), I multiply the closing stock price on the 45th day before the earnings 
announcement date with the number of shares outstanding on the same date.  I control 
for the number of analysts (ANUM), which is demonstrated to represent the 
incremental information flow around the earnings announcement (Bartov et al., 2000).  
Since earnings momentum and price momentum are closely related (Chan et al., 
1996; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2006), I control for price momentum by including 
compound return (COMP) over the six months prior to the earnings announcement.  I 
also control for trading volume (VOL), which is shown to increase price momentum 
(Lee and Swaminathan, 2000).  Trading volume is measured as the average daily 
turnover during the forty-five days before the earnings announcement, where daily 
turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded each day to the number of shares 
outstanding.  Finally, I examine whether there is a difference between positive 
earnings surprise and negative earnings surprise.  If the earnings surprise is positive, 
the dummy variable (SIGN) is 1, and it is 0 otherwise.  
 Panel A of Table 7 shows that the coefficient estimate (0.0411) of the 
unexpected earnings variable (SUE_AFE) is positive and significant.  The parameter 
estimate of ΔV×SUE_AFE is −0.0398 and significant at the 0.01 level.  This implies 
that the return to a zero-investment portfolio, consisting of firms in the lowest 
information uncertainty (ΔV) with a long position in SUE_AFE decile 10 and a short 
position in SUE_AFE decile 1, is 4.11%.  The incremental change in the above return 
is −3.98% if positions are taken in the highest as opposed to the lowest ΔV decile; this 
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means that the change of information uncertainty and PEAD is negatively associated, 
but note that early updated forecasts are used in regressions of Panel A and Panel B. 
 Panel B of Table 7 shows the result of the multiple regression including 
control variables.  The parameter estimate of ΔV×SUE_AFE is still negative 
(−0.0399) and significant at the 0.01 level, while the parameter estimates of 
COMP×SUE_AFE and ANUM×SUE_AFE are 0.0474 and 0.0233, respectively. The 
estimates of both the compounded return (COMP×SUE_AFE) and the number of 
analysts (ANUM×SUE_AFE) are significant at the 0.01 level.  This result implies that 
the incremental change in return is 4.74% and 2.33% if positions are taken in the 
highest as opposed to the lowest COMP and ANUM deciles, respectively.  
 The negative coefficients of change of information uncertainty 
(ΔV×SUE_AFE) shown in Panel A and Panel B are consistent with Liang’s (2003) 
results.  As I discussed earlier, I ascribe these results to the usage of early forecast 
updates, and I expect that the change of uncertainty (ΔV) and return drift (CAR_2_60) 
will be positively associated when using late forecast updates. 
 The regression results in Panel C and D of Table 7, which are based on late 
updated forecasts (6, 45), meet my expectation.  Both regression results show that the 
change of information uncertainty (ΔV) has a positive incremental effect on return 
drift.  Panel D of Table 7 shows the result of the complete regression model.  The 
coefficient estimate of the unexpected earnings variable (SUE_AFE) is 0.0012.  The 
parameter estimates of ΔV×SUE_AFE, SIZE×SUE_AFE, VOL×SUE_RET, 
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COMP×SUE_RET, and ANUM×SUE_RET are 0.0239, 0.0182, 0.0176, 0.0398 and 
−0.0296, respectively, and all are significant at the 0.05 level.  This implies that the 
return to a zero-investment portfolio, consisting of firms in the lowest information 
uncertainty (ΔV), the lowest firm size (SIZE), the lowest trading volume (VOL), the 
lowest compound return (COMP), and the lowest number of analysts (ANUM) with a 
long position in SUE_AFE decile 10 and a short position in SUE_AFE decile 1, is 
0.12%.  The incremental change in the above return is 2.39%, 1.82%, 1.76%, 3.98% 
and −2.96% if positions are taken in the highest as opposed to the lowest ΔV, SIZE, 
VOL, COMP, and ANUM deciles.  The only coefficient estimate that does not meet 
my expectation is firm size (SIZE), which shows positive incremental effect on return 
drift.  I speculate that this is caused by the fact that the sample contains mostly large 
firms, and it is difficult to discriminate a firm size effect in a sample comprised of 
only relatively large firms.  
 In summary, through the regression results shown in Table 7, I conclude that 
the effect of the change of information uncertainty on return drift is sensitive to the 
collection timing of analysts’ forecasts.  When an appropriate collection timing of 
analysts’ forecasts is used (i.e., forecast window (6, 45)), information uncertainty that 





Chapter 6: Supplemental Tests 
6.1 Forecast Error Based SUE versus Abnormal Return Based SUE 
I supplement the tests in Table 7 with regressions using abnormal returns 
surrounding earnings announcements as an alternative earnings surprise measure 
(SUE_RET), because tests of H1 find that analyst forecast dispersion is sensitive to 
the market’s response to earnings surprises.  If SUE_RET is a better earnings surprise 
measure to control for the sensitivity of analyst forecast dispersion, I expect that it 
will support the positive association between information uncertainty and PEAD 
more strongly than SUE_AFE.  
Table 8 shows the regression results when SUE_RET is used as an earnings 
surprise measure.  The regressions are based on the late updated forecasts (forecasts 
window of (6, 45)).23  Since SUE_RET is the three day cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding earnings announcement dates, the dependent variable of the regression is 
defined as cumulative abnormal returns between the second and the sixtieth day after 
earnings announcement dates (CAR_2_60) instead of CAR_1_60. 
The results show that the change of information uncertainty has a positive 
incremental effect on return drift in both regressions.  Moreover, the coefficient 
estimates of ΔV (0.0539 in Panel A and 0.0429 in Panel B of Table 8) are larger than 
                                                 
23 To make the table succinct, I did not present the regression result of using forecasts window (0, 5).  
The regression result of forecast window (0, 5) shows that change of information uncertainty and 
return drift are negatively associated.  In sum, regardless of the earnings surprise measures, change of 
information uncertainty has a negative incremental effect on return drift when early forecast updates 
are used.    
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the corresponding estimates shown in Table 7 (0.0361 in Panel C and 0.0294 in Panel 
D). This result supports the idea that when SUE_RET is used as the earnings surprise 
measure, the positive association between information uncertainty and PEAD is more 
strongly supported than when earnings surprises are measured with SUE_AFE. 
  
6.2 Change in Information Uncertainty versus Level of Information 
Uncertainty  
I also ran regressions using the level of information uncertainty (V) instead of 
the change of information uncertainty (ΔV), and the results are reported in Table 9.24  
The results show that the level of uncertainty also has a positive incremental effect on 
return drift in both regressions, but the coefficient estimates of V (0.0093 in Panel A) 
is significant only at the level of 0.10.  Overall, the coefficient estimates of V (0.0093 
in Panel A and 0.0149 in Panel B of Table 9) are much smaller than the 
corresponding estimates shown in Table 8 (0.0539 in Panel A and 0.0429 in Panel B).  
Untabulated test results show that when SUE_AFE is used as an earnings surprise 
measure, the level of information uncertainty (V) no longer has a positive incremental 
effect on PEAD.  In summary, I conclude that change of information uncertainty 
shows a stronger positive association with PEAD than does level of uncertainty.  
                                                 
24 The number of firm-quarters increased to 49,594 for this regression because analysts do not have to 
make forecasts before earnings announcement dates, which is required to measure change of 
uncertainty.  Using the original sample (N=23,740), however, provides the same result as using the 
increased number of firm-quarters.   
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6.3 Sub-sample Tests 
Finally, I ran regressions using sub-samples to see if my results are consistent 
across different quarters and different years.  For the tests shown in Table 10, I use 
SUE_RET as the earnings surprise measure, and I also use late forecast updates.  
Panel A of Table 10 shows the regression results of four different quarters.  Except 
for the third quarter, in which the coefficient estimate of the change of uncertainty is 
negative but insignificant (−0.0062), the first, the second, and the fourth quarters have 
positive and significant coefficient estimates of the change of uncertainty.  I speculate 
that coefficient in the third quarter is not significantly positive because the third 
quarter sub-sample has the shortest forecast horizon.25  As the forecast horizon 
becomes short, forecast errors and consequently change of uncertainty become 
smaller (see Figure 5).  The comparison of the mean forecast errors between quarterly 
sub-samples, which is not tabulated, confirms that the third-quarter sub-sample has 
the smallest forecast error and the smallest change of uncertainty.  Therefore, I 
conclude that in the third-quarter sub-sample, the change of uncertainty might be not 
large enough to show a positive association with the return drift. 
 Panel B of Table 10 shows the regression results of six different two- and 
three-year sub-samples.  Among those six, three sub-samples show positive and 
significant coefficient estimates of the change of uncertainty, while the other three 
                                                 
25 Note that I use one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts for the first, second, and the third firm-
quarters, while using two-year-ahead (one-year-ahead) annual earnings forecasts before (after) the 
fourth-quarter earnings announcement. Therefore, the third quarter has the shorted forecast horizon.  
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groups show insignificant coefficient estimates.  When I examine the coefficient 
estimates of the change of uncertainty year by year, which is not tabulated, only five 
annual samples have negative coefficients, while twelve annual samples have positive 
coefficients among the total seventeen annual samples; only one year (2003) shows a 
significantly negative coefficient, while seven annual samples show significantly 
positive coefficients at the 0.01 level.  Therefore, I conclude that the positive 
association between change of information uncertainty and return drift is valid over 
the years in general.26    
I notice that especially recent samples (2001-2005) do not support my 
hypothesis very well, and I wonder if the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg 
FD) is associated with this result.  There is a stream of studies which examine the 
influence of Reg FD on analysts’ forecasts.  Although an earlier study of Heflin, 
Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) argues that there is no reliable evidence of changes 
in analysts’ earnings forecast errors or dispersion, more recent studies using larger 
samples find that analysts’ forecast accuracy decreased and forecast dispersion 
increased after Reg FD was adopted (Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong, 2003; Agrawal, 
Chadha, and Chen, 2006).  Examining my samples, I have the same results as shown 
in Bailey et al. (2003) and Agrawal et al. (2006).  Since analyst forecast accuracy and 
dispersion are main variables to measure information uncertainty in this study, Reg 
                                                 
26 Because of the variance of the coefficients over time, I ran Fama-MacBeth type regressions.  The 
results are shown in Table 11.  The coefficients for the change of uncertainty is still positive (0.0410) 
and significant.  
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FD may influence the result of this study by changing forecast accuracy and 
dispersion. 
An alternative explanation is that the Reg FD might influence PEAD directly 
by changing the information flow of the market and speed of the price lead on 
earnings as posited by Ayers and Freeman (2003).  My coarse examination, which is 
not tabulated, shows that arbitrage profits obtained from zero-investment portfolios 
are smaller in the post-Reg FD period than in the pre-Reg FD period.  In summary, I 
speculate that Reg FD might weaken my conclusion about the positive relation 
between the information uncertainty extracted from analysts’ forecasts and return 




Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
This dissertation examines the association between information uncertainty 
measured using analysts’ forecasts and PEAD.  Several prior studies posit and find 
that information uncertainty measured through analyst forecast dispersion is 
negatively associated with PEAD.  This result is contradictory to the prediction based 
on traditional PEAD studies. Moreover, studies that use various other proxies for 
information uncertainty besides analyst forecast dispersion find a positive association 
between information uncertainty and PEAD.  This study attempts to reconcile these 
conflicting empirical results.  In this study, I show that information uncertainty is in 
fact positively associated with PEAD, even when analysts’ forecasts are used to 
measure information uncertainty.  
I find that the negative association of prior studies is caused by not fully 
considering analyst forecast behavior after earnings announcements.  Information 
uncertainty measured using analysts’ forecasts is sensitive to forecast collection 
timing (i.e., when the forecasts are made).  I argue that late updated forecasts are 
more appropriate than early updated forecasts to measure information uncertainty 
because early updated forecasts are heavily influenced by public information such as 
the market’s response to earnings surprises.  In contrast, late updated forecasts are the 
result of incorporating both public and private information, which provides a broader 
view into investors’ actual information environment.    
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I also argue that early updated forecasts are inappropriate to measure 
information uncertainty because analysts’ concern of the timeliness of their forecasts 
causes them to make hasty forecasts, which contaminate not only forecast accuracy 
but also forecast dispersion of the early updated forecasts.  I find that early updated 
forecasts have lower forecast dispersion than late updated forecasts.  By using late 
updated forecasts, I find that information uncertainty is in fact positively (not 
negatively) associated with PEAD.   
My research contributes to the accounting literature by clarifying the 
association among analyst forecast dispersion, information uncertainty, and PEAD.  
Most importantly, by showing the positive association between information 
uncertainty and PEAD, this study strengthens the argument that reducing information 
uncertainty improves market efficiency, i.e., more reliable or more objective 
information is beneficial to the market.  This study also contributes to the literature 
about analysts’ forecasts by showing that analysts’ forecasts need to be carefully 
collected and modified to properly represent information uncertainty.  Finally, this 
study adds insight on why PEAD exists.  By showing the positive relation between 
information uncertainty and PEAD, this study provides empirical support for the 
argument of Daniel et al. (1998), which attributes PEAD to overconfidence in private 
information and self-attribution bias, although it does not rule out other PEAD 
explanations.     
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 Table 1. Sample Selection  
Panel A. Number of firm-quarters   
53,436 All firm-quarters having more than one analyst who make forecasts both before 
and after quarterly earnings announcements.†
46,480 Firm-quarters having necessary Compustat and CRSP data. 
31,909 Firm-quarters having the same quarterly earnings announcement date in I/B/E/S 
and Compustat. 
29,506 Firm-quarters having greater than or equal to $1.00 closing stock price on the 
forty-fifth day before the quarterly earnings announcement date. 
23,740 Firm-quarters having greater than 60 days and less than 90 days interval before 
the next quarter’s announcement date. 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution by fiscal years and by fiscal quarters 
          Year       Firm-quarters 
           1989          916     
           1990        1190         
           1991        1126         
           1992        1109         
           1993          950         
           1994        1434         
           1995        1312         
           1996        1484         
           1997        1622         
           1998        1925         
           1999        1621         
           2000        1203         
           2001        1570         
           2002        1519         
           2003        1606         
           2004        1647         
           2005        1506   
      Total          23,740 
         Quarter    Firm-quarters 
              1            7528        
              2            6795        
              3            7310        
              4            2107         
       Total          23,740 
†Analysts’ forecasts are one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts.  Two-year-ahead annual earnings 
forecasts are used only before the fourth-quarter earnings announcement, and one-year-ahead annual 
earnings forecasts are used after the fourth-quarter earnings announcement to match the same annual 
earnings forecasts.  To be included in the sample, at least two analysts must make annual earnings 
forecast within forty-five days before the quarterly earnings announcement date and they must update 
their annual earnings forecast between the sixth day and the forty-fifth day after the quarterly earnings 
announcement date, i.e., the forecast windows are (-45, -1) and (6, 45), where 0 is the quarterly 




Table 2. Sample Description 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (N=23,740) 
Variables Mean Std. Error Median 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR_2_60) -0.00993 0.21087 -0.01329 
Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE_AFE) -0.00055 0.03599  0.00025 
SUE measured by three day abnormal returns 
(SUE_RET) 
 0.00167 0.07513  0.00092 
Forecasts Dispersion (DISP)  0.00431 0.08915  0.00012 
Correlation of the Forecast Errors (ρ)  0.59057 0.48422  0.81684 
Uncertainty (V)  0.05698 1.59840  0.00103 
Change of Uncertainty (ΔV: V_after – V_before) -0.01105 0.04904 -0.00074 
Squared Error of the Mean Forecast (SE)  0.05384 1.59337  0.00065 
Number of Analysts Following (N) 4.54 3.57 3.0 




SUE_AFE SUE_RET DISP ρ V ΔV SIZE 
CAR_2_60         
SUE_AFE   0.0765**        
SUE_RET   0.0593**   0.2648**       
DISP -0.0205** 0.0141* -0.0373**      
ρ -0.0119  -0.0081 0.0094 -0.3827**     
V -0.0250** 0.0103 -0.0242**  0.6171**  0.3725**    
ΔV  0.0878**   0.1216**  0.0691** -0.2677** -0.0214** -0.2703**   
SIZE  0.0562** 0.0104  0.0180** -0.0745** -0.0853** -0.1542**  0.1253**  
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Table 2. Continued 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation Coefficients (N=23,740)  
Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown in the top (bottom) triangle.  
*   Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
CAR_2_60 is cumulative size-adjusted return over the trading day window (2, 60), where 2 is the second day after the earnings announcement 
date.  The daily abnormal return for firm j on day t (ARjt) is computed as follows: ARjt = Rjt – Rpt , where Rjt is the daily raw return for firm j 
on day t and Rpt is the equally weighted mean return on day t of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm size decile.  
SUE_AFE = (IBES Actual quarterly EPS – Mean Forecast) / Stock_Price_45Days, where Mean Forecast is the average of the one-quarter-ahead 
forecasts made within forty-five days before the earnings announcement date, and Stock_Price_45Days is the closing stock price on the 45th 
day before the earnings announcement date.  The firm-quarters must have at least two analysts’ forecasts, and Stock_Price_45Days must be 
greater than or equal to $1.00 to be included in the sample.   
SUE_RET is cumulative size-adjusted return over the trading day window (-1, 1) surrounding the earnings announcement date. The daily 


















, where fi is the earnings forecast by analyst i, f is the mean forecast 
across analysts, and N is the number of forecasts.   














SIZE is the multiplication of the number of shares outstanding on the 45th day before the earnings 
announcement date and the closing stock price of the same date.  
 
Note:  
1. Analysts’ forecasts used for each variable are one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts.  Two-year-
ahead annual earnings forecast are used for the variable calculation before the fourth quarter 
earnings announcement only, and one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts are used after the 
fourth-quarter earnings announcement to match the same annual earnings forecasts 
2. DISP, SE, V are scaled by the closing stock price on the 45th day before earnings announcement 
date. 
3. Except for CAR_2_60, all variables are deciles transformations based on their sample distribution 
within calendar quarters where the earnings announcement date belongs.  
4. If there is no additional indication such as ‘_before’, all variables are calculated using analysts’ 
forecasts made after the quarterly earnings announcement.  
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CAR_1_60 CAR_2_60 SUE_RET 
Decile 
CAR_2_60 
1(Lowest) -0.031 -0.017 1(Lowest) -0.038 
2 -0.029 -0.022 2 -0.021 
3 -0.032 -0.025 3 -0.018 
4 -0.032 -0.029 4 -0.007 
5 -0.025 -0.022 5 -0.015 
6 -0.015 -0.017 6 -0.009 
7  0.004 -0.002 7  0.003 
8  0.003 -0.004 8 -0.006 
9  0.019  0.010 9 -0.005 
10(Highest)  0.039  0.028 10(Highest)  0.018 
10-1  0.070  0.045 10-1  0.056 
Deciles are formed based on rankings of standardized unexpected earnings within calendar quarters.  
CAR_1(2)_60 is cumulative size-adjusted return over the trading day window of (1(2), 60), where 1 (2) 
is the first (second) day after the earnings announcement date.  The daily abnormal return for firm 
j on day t (ARjt) is computed as follows: ARjt = Rjt – Rpt , where Rjt is the daily raw return for firm j 
on day t and Rpt is the equally weighted mean return on day t of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm 
size decile.  
SUE_AFE = (IBES Actual quarterly EPS – Mean Forecast) / Stock_Price_45Days, where Mean 
Forecast is the average of the one-quarter-ahead forecasts made within forty five days before the 
earnings announcement date, and Stock_Price_45Days is the closing stock price on the 45th day 
before the earnings announcement date.  The firm-quarters must have at least two analysts’ 
forecasts, and Stock_Price_45Days must be greater than or equal to $1.00 to be included in the 
sample.   
SUE_RET is cumulative size-adjusted return over the trading day window (-1, 1) surrounding the 
earnings announcement date. The daily abnormal return is calculated in the same manner as 
explained in CAR_1_60 variable.   
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Table 4. Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Change of Information Uncertainty 
Panel A. DISP (Analyst forecast dispersion) and ΔV (Change of information 
uncertainty) distribution by earnings surprise deciles (N=38,679) 
SUE_AFE 
Decile 
DISP ΔV SUE_RET 
Decile 
DISP ΔV 
1 (Lowest) 0.0047 -0.0453 1 (Lowest) 0.0023 -0.0218 
2 0.0015 -0.0107 2 0.0018 -0.0143 
3 0.0008 -0.0057 3 0.0015 -0.0105 
4 0.0007 -0.0048 4 0.0014 -0.0088 
5 0.0006 -0.0031 5 0.0016 -0.0097 
6 0.0007 -0.0034 6 0.0015 -0.0089 
7 0.0008 -0.0037 7 0.0015 -0.0088 
8 0.0011 -0.0044 8 0.0014 -0.0077 
9 0.0015 -0.0065 9 0.0015 -0.0084 
10 (Highest) 0.0041 -0.0221 10 (Highest) 0.0018 -0.0108 
Mean 0.0016 -0.0109 Mean 0.0016 -0.0109 
 
Panel B. DISP (Analyst forecast dispersion) by earnings surprise quintiles  
SUE_RET Quintile 









































































Quintile   
5-1 0.0007 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0010* -0.0020**  
* Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
Note: Unlike the final samples used for the sample descriptions and the final regression analysis, the 
samples used in this Table 4 include forecasts updated immediately after the earnings announcement, 
i.e., forecasts window is (0,45) where 0 is the earnings announcement date.  
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Table 5. General Pattern of Analyst Forecast Updating Behavior‡
Panel A. Forecast updating promptness    
Interval Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0   21,590     5.43     5.43 
1 112,250   28.24   33.68 
2   45,945   11.56   45.24 
3   20,832     5.24   50.48 
4   13,777     3.47   53.94 
5   10,015     2.52   56.46 
6-45 173,023   43.54 100.00 
Total 397,432 100.00 - 
 
Panel B. Number of forecast updates 
Number of Updates Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 259,760 65.36   65.36 
2 104,136 26.20   91.56 
3   19,227   4.84   96.40 
4   10,871   2.74   99.13 
5<=     3,438   0.87 100.00 
Total 397,432           100.00   - 
 
‡ All individual analysts’ annual earnings forecast updates made between 0 and 45 days after the 
quarterly earnings announcement are included in the sample.  To be included in the sample, 
analysts must make one-year-ahead annual earnings forecast(s) (two-year-ahead annual earnings 
forecast(s) only for the fourth quarter) within forty-five days before the quarterly earnings 
announcement date.   
Interval shows how soon analysts update their forecasts after the quarterly earnings announcement: 0 
means that analysts update annual earnings forecasts on the same day as the quarterly earnings 
announcement date.  
Number of Updates means how many times analysts update annual earnings forecasts within forty-five 







Table 6. Forecast Window (0, 5) versus Forecast Window (6, 45) 
Panel A. Difference of DISP (Analyst forecast dispersion) and ΔV (Change of 

















1(Lowest) 0.0044 0.0157    0.0113**  
(3.27) 
-0.0375 -0.0427    -0.0059 
(-1.38) 
2 0.0022 0.0019   -0.0003 
    (-0.83) 
-0.0168 -0.0137     0.0031 
 (0.76) 
3 0.0008 0.0011    0.0003 
(1.37) 
-0.0081 -0.0083    -0.0002 
(-0.18) 
4 0.0004 0.0017    0.0013 
(1.66) 
-0.0038 -0.0053    -0.0015 
(-1.76) 
5 0.0007 0.0021    0.0014 
(1.07) 
-0.0036 -0.0041    -0.0005 
(-0.57) 
6 0.0005 0.0008    0.0003* 
(2.01) 
-0.0019 -0.0042 -0.0024** 
(-4.19) 
7 0.0009 0.0016    0.0007 
(1.57) 
-0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0031** 
(-3.94) 
8 0.0010 0.0018 0.0008** 
(2.71) 
-0.0017 -0.0059 -0.0043** 
(-5.32) 
9 0.0012 0.0023 0.0011** 
(3.99) 
-0.0036 -0.0086 -0.0050** 
(-4.91) 
10(Highest) 0.0036 0.0145 0.0109** 
(3.39) 




0.0015 0.0043 0.0028** 
(4.75) 





Table 6. Continued. 
Panel B. Difference of V (Information uncertainty) and SE (Squared mean forecast 

















1(Lowest) 0.0758 0.1761     0.0974** 
(4.11) 
0.1887 0.1648 -0.0269 
(-0.71) 
2 0.0375 0.0402     0.0004 
     (0.06) 
0.0896 0.0388 -0.0530 
(-1.22) 
3 0.0185 0.0147    -0.0035 
(-0.85) 
0.0342 0.0139 -0.0201 
(-1.30) 
4 0.0141 0.0232     0.0091 
(1.47) 
0.0192 0.0219  0.0027 
(0.61) 
5 0.0178 0.0170    -0.0006 
 (-0.11) 
0.0189 0.0156 -0.0031 
(-0.69) 
6 0.0099 0.0125     0.0027 
(1.06) 
0.0101 0.0119  0.0018 
(0.72) 
7 0.0169 0.0175     0.0006 
(0.15) 
0.0229 0.0164 -0.0065 
(-1.24) 
8 0.0148 0.0224     0.0079 
(1.24) 
0.0141 0.0211  0.0073 
(1.13) 
9 0.0273 0.0272     0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.0286 0.0256 -0.0030 
(-0.84) 
10(Highest) 0.0503 0.2696 0.2233* 
(2.26) 




0.0274 0.0613     0.0340** 
(3.39) 





Table 6. Continued. 
Panel C. ΔV (Change of information uncertainty) by earnings surprise quintiles: 
forecast window (0, 5)  
SUE_RET Quintile 







  -0.0286 
(N=948) 
  -0.0219 
(N=714) 
 -0.0200 









  -0.0054 
(N=1196) 
  -0.0054 
(N=958) 
 -0.0046 









  -0.0023 
(N=1221) 
  -0.0022 
 (N=1218) 
 -0.0009 









  -0.0018 
(N=1050) 
  -0.0015 
(N=1265) 
  0.0002 









  -0.0072 
(N=949) 
  -0.0054 
(N=1215) 
 -0.0074 





Quintile   
5-1  0.0083 0.0094**    0.0187**  0.0160** 0.0123**  
 
Panel D. ΔV (Change of information uncertainty) by earnings surprise quintiles: 
forecast window (6, 45)
SUE_RET Quintile 







  -0.0252 
 (N=839) 
  -0.0234 
(N=678) 










  -0.0069 
  (N=1008) 
  -0.0064 
(N=815) 










  -0.0045 
  (N=1074) 
  -0.0021 
 (N=1036) 










  -0.0061 
(N=941) 
  -0.0051 
(N=1122) 










  -0.0116 
(N=850) 
  -0.0118 
(N=1071) 






Quintile   
5-1 0.0225**  0.0023   0.0126**  0.0146**  0.0230**  
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
*   Significant at p < 0.05. 





DISP_0_5 [DISP_6_45]: Analysts’ forecast dispersion calculated using updated annual earnings 
forecasts made over the trading day window (0, 5) [(6, 45)], where 0 is the earnings announcement 
date and 5 is the fifth day after earnings announcement date.  If the same analyst makes more than 
one forecast within this period, the latest forecast is used.  
ΔV_0_5 [ΔV_6_45]: The subtraction of information uncertainty measured using forecasts made before 
the earnings announcement (-45, -1), from information uncertainty measured using forecasts 
updated over the trading day window (0, 5) [(6, 45)].  To be included in the sample, the same 
analyst makes forecast(s) in both periods.  If analysts make more than one forecast within each 
period, the latest forecast is used. 
V_0_5 [V_6_45]: Information uncertainty measured using forecasts made over the trading day window 
(0, 5) [(6, 45)].  To be included in the sample, the same analyst makes forecast(s) before the 
earnings announcements (-45, -1).  If analysts make more than one forecast within each period, the 
latest forecast is used.  See Table 2 for the calculation of V. 
SE_0_5 [SE_6_45]: Squared error of the mean forecast measured using forecasts updated over the 
trading day window (0, 5) [(6, 45)].  To be included in the sample, the same analyst makes 
forecast(s) before the earnings announcements (-45, -1).  If analysts make more than one forecast 
within each period, the latest forecast is used.  See Table 2 for the calculation of SE. 
 
Other variable definitions are in Table 2.
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Table 7. Regression Tests of the Influence of Information Uncertainty on PEAD 
Panel A. Forecast window (0, 5) 
jqjqjqjqjq AFESUEVAFESUE2_60CAR εβββ +×Δ++= ___ 210                               (N=27,015) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept  -0.0111** 
(-4.29) 
 
β1 SUE_AFEjq +  0.0411** 
(7.64) 
 

















_                       





                  (N=27,015) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept     -0.0073* 
(-2.40) 
 
β1 SUE_AFEjq +                -0.0260 
(-1.38) 
 
β2 Chg Uncertainty -     -0.0399** 
(-5.65) 
 
β3 Size - -0.0142 
(-1.70) 
 
β4 Trading Volume +  0.0034 
(0.45) 
 
β5 Compound Return +      0.0474** 
(6.56) 
 
β6 Number of 
     Analysts 
-      0.0233** 
(2.78) 
 





Table 7. Continued. 
Panel C. Forecast window (6, 45) 
jqjqjqjqjq AFESUEVAFESUE_2_60CAR εβββ +×Δ++= __ 210                                 (N=23,740) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept  -0.0331** 
(-12.94) 
 
β1 SUE_AFEjq +  0.0305** 
(5.52) 
 
β2 Chg Uncertainty +  0.0300** 
(4.20) 
0.0054 














_                  





                                   (N=23,740) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept     -0.0320** 
 (-10.57) 
 
β1 SUE_AFEjq +  0.0012 
(0.08) 
 
β2 Chg Uncertainty +      0.0239** 
(3.29) 
 
β3 Size -     0.0182* 
(2.25) 
 
β4 Trading Volume +     0.0176* 
(2.34) 
 
β5 Compound Return +      0.0398** 
(5.49) 
 
β6 Number of  
     Analysts 
-    -0.0296** 
 (-3.68) 
 
β7 Sign of SUE +                0.0063 
(0.54) 
0.0076 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
* Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
VOLjq:  The average daily turnover of firm j during the forty-five days before the quarter q earnings 
announcement, where daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded each day to the 
number of shares outstanding. 
COMPjq: The compound return of firm j over the six months prior to the quarter q earnings ann.. 
ANUMjq: The number of analysts who make annual earnings forecasts of firm j both before and after 
the quarter q earnings ann..  
SIGNjq: A dummy variable equal to 1 when earnings surprise (SUE_AFE) of firm j at quarter q is 
positive; 0 when SUE_AFE is negative. 
Other variable definitions are in Table 2. 
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Table 8. Regression Tests of the Influence of Information Uncertainty on PEAD 
            - When SUE_RET is Used as an Earnings Surprise Measure 
Panel A. Forecast window (6, 45) 
jqjqjqjqjq RETSUEVRETSUE2_60CAR εβββ +×Δ++= ___ 210                                      (N=23,740) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept    -0.0288** 
(-11.30) 
 
β1 SUE_RETjq + 0.0101 
(1.76) 
 



















_                       





                                    (N=23,740) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept     -0.0275** 
(-10.67) 
 
β1 SUE_RETjq +  -0.0227* 
(-2.37) 
 
β2 Chg Uncertainty +     0.0429** 
(5.71) 
 
β3 Size - 0.0068 
(0.84) 
 
β4 Trading Volume + 0.0145 
(1.93) 
 
β5 Compound Return +    0.0544** 
(7.52) 
 
β6 Number of  
     Analysts 
-   -0.0269** 
(-3.34) 
 
β7 Sign of SUE +    0.0156** 
(2.98) 
0.0095 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
* Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
See Table 2 and Table 7 for variable definitions. 
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Table 9. Regression Tests of the Influence of Information Uncertainty on PEAD 
               - When Level of Uncertainty is Used Instead of Change of Uncertainty 
Panel A. Forecast window (6, 45) 
jqjqjqjqjq RETSUEVRETSUE2_60CAR εβββ +×++= ___ 210                                        (N=49,594) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept  -0.0188** 
(-10.45) 
 
β1 SUE_RETjq +  0.0314** 
(7.90) 
 



















_                       





                  (N=49,594) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept  -0.0173** 
(-9.51) 
 
β1 SUE_RETjq +               0.0014 
(0.20) 
 
β2 Uncertainty +  0.0149** 
(2.81) 
 
β3 Size -              -0.0055 
(-0.90) 
 
β4 Trading Volume +               0.0073 
(1.36) 
 
β5 Compound Return +  0.0423** 
(8.34) 
 
β6 Number of  
    Analysts 
-             -0.0236** 
(-3.91) 
 
β7 Sign of SUE +  0.0194** 
(5.18) 
0.0058 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
* Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
















_                       





Table 10. Regression Tests of the Influence of Information Uncertainty on PEAD 
  - Sub-sample Tests    
 













β0 Intercept    -0.0301** 
(-6.87) 
     -0.0393** 
(-8.28) 
    -0.0145** 
(-2.98) 
   -0.0265** 
(-3.08) 
β1 SUE_RETjq -0.0223 
(-1.42) 




   0.0700* 
(2.15) 
β2 Chg Uncertainty     0.0403** 
(3.30) 




   0.0498* 
(2.25) 
















β5 Compound Return     0.0852** 
(7.08) 






β6 Number of  

















    Adjusted R2 0.0160 0.0237 0.0071 0.0177 
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Table 10. Continued. 




Coefficient 1989-1991 1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2005 
β0 Intercept      -0.0275** 
(-5.36) 
   -0.0238** 
(-4.81) 
     -0.0302** 
(-5.49) 
    -0.0502** 
(-6.57) 








   -0.0438* 
(-2.12) 






β2 Chg  
    Uncertainty 




     0.0666**      
(4.13) 


















β4 Trading  
     Volume 












β5 Compound  
    Rreturn 
-0.0208 
(-1.43) 
      -0.0154 
(-1.10) 
   0.0359* 
(2.31) 
    0.1820** 
(8.19) 
 0.0231 
(1.27)   
     0.0582** 
(3.90) 
β6 Number of  

























   Adjusted R2  0.0273 0.0093 0.0129 0.0323  0.0045  0.0106 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
* Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
See Table 2 and Table 7 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 11. Fama-MacBeth Regression Tests 
Panel A. Forecast window (6, 45) 
jqjqjqjqjq RETSUEVRETSUE2_60CAR εβββ +×Δ++= ___ 210                                      (N=23,740) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept    -0.0260** 
(-4.88) 
 
β1 SUE_RETjq + 0.0110 
(1.21) 
 



















_                       





                                    (N=23,740) 
Coefficient Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2
β0 Intercept     -0.0250** 
(-4.47) 
 
β1 SUE_RETjq +               -0.0090 
(-0.45) 
 
β2 Chg Uncertainty +     0.0410** 
 (3.29) 
 
β3 Size -                0.0050 
 (0.38) 
 
β4 Trading Volume + 0.0150 
 (0.65) 
 
β5 Compound Return +     0.0440** 
 (2.52) 
 
β6 Number of  




β7 Sign of SUE +  0.0130 
 (1.72) 
0.0560 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
* Significant at p < 0.05. 
** Significant at p < 0.01. 
See Table 2 and Table 7 for variable definitions. 
The results represent Fama-MacBeth regressions for 68 cross-sections from the first quarter of 1989 to 















Firm Value Estimate 
 
Figure 1. Overconfidence in Firm Value Estimation.  
(A) Investors’ distribution of subjective estimates is too narrow relative to the actual 
underlying distribution.  
(B) The overconfidence bias is exacerbated by increased information uncertainty.  In a high 
information uncertainty setting, the actual underlying distribution of firm value estimates 
is more diffused.  To the extent that investors’ subjective assessment of probabilities does 
not fully adjust for the increased variance in the underlying distribution, investors’ 
behavior will exhibit patterns consistent with elevated levels of overconfidence.  
Figure 1 is a reproduction from Jiang et al. (2005).    
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Figure 5.  Changing Pattern of Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Change of 
Uncertainty 
(A) Mean analyst forecast dispersion over one year forecast horizon: dispersion decreases as 
forecast horizon becomes short.  However, dispersion of forecast window (6, 45) is larger 
than the dispersion of forecast window (0, 5) after each quarterly earnings announcement 
date, although the forecast horizon is shorter.  
(B) Mean change of uncertainty over one year forecast horizon: absolute value of change of 
uncertainty decreases (i.e., less change of uncertainty) as forecast horizon becomes short.  
Similar to (A), there is more change of uncertainty (i.e., larger absolute value of change 
of uncertainty) of forecast window (6, 45) than in the case of forecast window (0, 5) after 
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